How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games

DOI10.1006/game.2001.0855zbMath1015.91027OpenAlexW2160987720MaRDI QIDQ700104

Leigh Thompson, Kathleen Valley, Max H. Bazerman, Robert D. Gibbons

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7cf4a263353bc2680e6c18ef67daf382aec048a9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment ⋮ Resolving crises through automated bilateral negotiations ⋮ Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach ⋮ How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication ⋮ Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis ⋮ Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets ⋮ Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes ⋮ Bilateral trading with naive traders ⋮ Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case ⋮ Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Strategic Information Transmission