How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0855zbMATH Open1015.91027OpenAlexW2160987720MaRDI QIDQ700104FDOQ700104
Authors: Kathleen Valley, Leigh Thompson, Max H. Bazerman, Robert D. Gibbons 
Publication date: 30 September 2002
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/7cf4a263353bc2680e6c18ef67daf382aec048a9
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Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- Bilateral trading with naive traders
- Lies and consequences. The effect of lie detection on communication outcomes
- Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
- The influence of face-to-face communication: a principal-agent experiment
- How naiveté improves efficiency in trading with preplay communication
- Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case
- Resolving crises through automated bilateral negotiations
- How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
- Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach
- Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
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