When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.12.001zbMATH Open1397.91097OpenAlexW2775381519MaRDI QIDQ1787313FDOQ1787313

Authors: Tsz-Ning Wong, Lily Ling Yang 

Publication date: 5 October 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.001

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zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionpersuasionvoluntary disclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited In (2)

• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games

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