Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.023MaRDI QIDQ709095zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shinichiro Takizawa

Publication date 15 October 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.023

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesprivate informationtrigger strategyirreversibilitydecisions under uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games
• Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
• Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring

Cites work

• Evaluating environmental investments: a real options approach
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication
• Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
• The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions

Cited in

(7)

• The Navier-Stokes equations under a unilateral boundary condition of Signorini's type
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
• Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
• When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion
• The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models with incomplete information

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