Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
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Publication:709095
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.05.023zbMATH Open1196.91015OpenAlexW2042234459MaRDI QIDQ709095FDOQ709095
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.05.023
Recommendations
- The effect of decisions under uncertainty on imperfect monitoring games
- Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
- Belief-based equilibria in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with private monitoring
Cites Work
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players
- Evaluating environmental investments: a real options approach
- The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games
- The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions
- On the theory of repeated games with private information. II: Revelation through communication
Cited In (5)
- The Navier-Stokes equations under a unilateral boundary condition of Signorini's type
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
- When does monitoring hurt? Endogenous information acquisition in a game of persuasion
- Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
- Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models with incomplete information
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