Dynamic cheap talk with static informational control

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.04.003zbMATH Open1398.91096OpenAlexW2329452937MaRDI QIDQ1668263FDOQ1668263

Authors: Alexander Frug 

Publication date: 3 September 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.003

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zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkpairing functioninformation control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication
• Informational control and organizational design
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk
• Dynamic strategic information transmission

Cited In (4)

• Cheap talk and editorial control
• Limiting sender's information in Bayesian persuasion
• Strategic gradual learning and information transmission
• Dynamic information revelation in cheap talk

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