Error-proneness as a handicap signal

DOI10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00135-8MaRDI QIDQ2177336zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Kris De Jaegher

Publication date 6 May 2020

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(03)00135-8

zbMATH Keywords

error-prone signallinghandicap principlesignalling theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Animal behavior (92D50)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(8)

• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Threat displays are not handicaps
• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
• An evolutionary advantage for extravagant honesty
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals
• Runaway signals: exaggerated displays of commitment may result from second-order signaling
• Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
• Intentional vagueness

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