An evolutionary advantage for extravagant honesty

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2011.09.024MaRDI QIDQ2263469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Seth Bullock

Publication date 18 March 2015

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/272825/1/Accepted.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary attainabilityextravagancehandicap principlehonest signalling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(8)

• Perceptual advertisement by the prey of stalking or ambushing predators
• Threat displays are not handicaps
• Error-proneness as a handicap signal
• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
• Dishonest behavior: sin big or go home
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals
• Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle
• Evolutionary dynamics of the handicap principle: an example

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