Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2452989
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.011zbMATH Open1292.91119OpenAlexW1995838615WikidataQ57549460 ScholiaQ57549460MaRDI QIDQ2452989FDOQ2452989
Authors: Tatsuya Kitagawa, Yasushi Masuda, Masashi Umezawa
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.011
Recommendations
- Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival incorporating ad valorem royalties
- Licensing by fixed-fee and two-part tariff in a differentiated Stackelberg model when the follower is the innovator
- Licensing under general demand and cost functions
- Technology licensing and innovation -- A correction on two-part tariff analysis
- Intra-brand patent licensing with inter-brand competition
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
- On a non-cooperative theory of technology transfer
- Welfare reducing licensing.
- General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
- Drastic innovations and multiplicity of optimal licensing policies
- Royalty licensing
Cited In (14)
- Patent Licensing: Stackelberg Versus Cournot Models
- Patent licensing with spillovers
- More licensed technologies may make it worse: a welfare analysis of licensing vertically two-tier foreign technologies
- Estimation of patent licensing value using a flexible demand specification
- Technology licensing under product differentiation
- Optimal pricing for patent protected new products
- Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly
- Technology licensing and innovation -- A correction on two-part tariff analysis
- Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival incorporating ad valorem royalties
- Contract design for technology sharing between two farmers
- Technology licensing strategy for network product in a service industry
- Impact of technology development costs on licensing form in a differentiated Cournot duopoly
- On the optimal mix of patent instruments
- Impact of government subsidy on the remanufacturing industry regarding technology cooperation
This page was built for publication: Patent strength and optimal two-part tariff licensing with a potential rival
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2452989)