Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts

DOI10.1007/S00712-015-0468-YMaRDI QIDQ1654089zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pedro Mendi, Rafael Moner-Colonques, Jose J. Sempere-Monerris

Publication date 7 August 2018

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0468-y

zbMATH Keywords

know-howlicensingmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
• International licensing under an endogenous tariff in vertically-related markets
• Technology licensing under product differentiation

Cites work

• Does two-part tariff licensing agreement enhance both welfare and profit?
• Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model
• General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099358 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(5)

• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
• The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
• Exclusive and non-exclusive licensing with shelving

This page was built for publication: Optimal know-how transfers in licensing contracts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1654089)