Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.02.007MaRDI QIDQ645645zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefano Comino, Fabio M. Manenti, Antonio Nicolò

Publication date 10 November 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

information acquisitionintellectual propertylicensingpatentssequential innovation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information
• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• Licensing a sequence of innovations
• Bargaining and delay in patent licensing
• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments

Cites work

• Bargaining with endogenous information
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

Cited in

(6)

• Holdup and licensing of cumulative innovations with private information
• Step by step. The benefits of stage-based R\&D licensing contracts
• Effects of the sharing economy on sequential innovation products
• Milestone Payments or Royalties? Contract Design for R&D Licensing
• Licensing a sequence of innovations
• Sequential innovation, naked exclusion, and upfront lump-sum payments

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