The authors consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the so-called intellectual property rights owner can allocate licenses for the use of this property among interested agents. The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licenses. In a bargaining solution every agent obtains a weighted coverage of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players. The owner obtains the remaining surplus. This solution is characterized by five axioms: stability, stability dependence, scale covariance, anonymity and separability. Moreover, the symmetric solution is the nucleolus of a naturally related coalitional game.
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