Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior

DOI10.2307/2527142zbMATH Open0765.90035OpenAlexW1969578309MaRDI QIDQ4031381FDOQ4031381

Authors: Myong-Hun Chang 

Publication date: 1 April 1993

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2527142

Recommendations

• Cartel formation with quality differentiation
• Collusive behaviour under cost asymmetries when firms compete in supply functions
• Collusion in a differentiated duopoly with network externalities
• Tacit collusion and market concentration under network effects
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games

zbMATH Keywords

horizontal product differentiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (9)

• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
• Standardization and the stability of collusion
• Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Semicollusion vs. full collusion: the role of demand uncertainty and product substitutability.
• Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Cartel formation with quality differentiation
• A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale

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