Does price discrimination make collusion less likely? A delivered pricing model

DOI10.1007/S00712-020-00699-4MaRDI QIDQ2195260zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John S. Heywood, Dongyang Li, Guangliang Ye

Publication date 8 September 2020

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-020-00699-4

zbMATH Keywords

collusion stabilityspacial price discriminationuniform pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Intertemporal Price Competition

Cites work

• A spatial model of cartel stability: the influence of production cost convexity
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Endogenous third-degree price discrimination in Hotelling model with elastic demand
• Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
• Intertemporal Product Choice and Its Effects on Collusive Firm Behavior
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing

Cited in

(8)

• Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
• Guaranteed lowest prices: do they facilitate collusion?
• Personalized pricing with a price sensitive demand
• Price discrimination or uniform pricing: which colludes more?
• Full collusion vs. partial collusion in a spatial model: price and welfare comparison
• Tacit collusion in a spatial model with delivered pricing
• Cartel stability in a delivered pricing oligopoly
• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model

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