The entry incentives of complementary producers: a simple model with implications for antitrust policy

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.013zbMATH Open1207.91035OpenAlexW3122605568MaRDI QIDQ631279FDOQ631279

Authors: Nathan H. Miller, Juan Sebastián Lleras 

Publication date: 22 March 2011

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202386

Recommendations

• On the effects of downstream entry
• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Complementarity of goods and cooperation among firms in a dynamic duopoly
• Entry and merger policy
• Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

zbMATH Keywords

complementary productsentry incentivesvertical mergers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (8)

• Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game
• Separating complements: the effects of competition and quality leadership
• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
• Alliance partner choice in markets with vertical and horizontal externalities
• Threatening to buy: private equity buyouts and antitrust policy
• Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion
• Market foreclosure without vertical integration

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