The entry incentives of complementary producers: a simple model with implications for antitrust policy

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.11.013MaRDI QIDQ631279zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Nathan H. Miller, Juan Sebastián Lleras

Publication date 22 March 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/202386

zbMATH Keywords

complementary productsentry incentivesvertical mergers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• On the effects of downstream entry
• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Complementarity of goods and cooperation among firms in a dynamic duopoly
• Entry and merger policy
• Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives

Cited in

(8)

• Alliance partner choice in markets with vertical and horizontal externalities
• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Separating complements: the effects of competition and quality leadership
• Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
• Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game
• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
• Threatening to buy: private equity buyouts and antitrust policy
• Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion

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