Market foreclosure without vertical integration

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(94)00552-DMaRDI QIDQ1352209zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Michael Hardt

Publication date 27 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

CommitmentReputationL22SupergameSwitching costsVertical integration

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs
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Cites work

• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
• Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

Cited in

(5)

• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
• Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs
• Access pricing and exclusionary behavior
• The equivalence between internally vertical control and competition strategies

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