Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs

DOI10.1007/S007120200009MaRDI QIDQ698204zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann

Publication date 18 September 2002

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.38499.de/dp260.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentvertical integrationforeclosure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(9)

• On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
• Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
• Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
• Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties
• Vertical mergers with input substitution: double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
• Addendum to: ``A comment on `Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties'
• Market foreclosure without vertical integration
• Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
• The effect of vertical integration on consumer price in the presence of inventory costs.

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