Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs
From MaRDI portal
Publication:698204
DOI10.1007/S007120200009zbMATH Open1010.91038OpenAlexW3126080822MaRDI QIDQ698204FDOQ698204
Authors: Pio Baake, Ulrich Kamecke, Hans-Theo Normann 
Publication date: 18 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.38499.de/dp260.pdf
Recommendations
- Market foreclosure without vertical integration
- On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
- Vertical mergers with input substitution: double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
- Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
- Vertical integration without intrafirm trade
Cited In (9)
- On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
- Vertical foreclosure and multi-segment competition
- Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
- The effect of vertical integration on consumer price in the presence of inventory costs.
- Addendum to: ``A comment on `Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties'
- Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties
- Vertical mergers with input substitution: double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
- Market foreclosure without vertical integration
- Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
This page was built for publication: Vertical integration and market foreclosure with convex downstream costs
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q698204)
