Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2014.03.022zbMATH Open1338.91047OpenAlexW2092225201MaRDI QIDQ296731FDOQ296731
Nobuo Matsubayashi, Yuki Kumoi
Publication date: 23 June 2016
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2014.03.022
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)
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Cited In (4)
- Asymmetric product distribution between symmetric manufacturers using dual-channel supply chains
- When should a manufacturer set its direct price and wholesale price in dual-channel supply chains?
- The effects and incentive of vertical mergers: an analysis from the view of OM
- A supply chain member should set its margin later if another member's cost is highly uncertain
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