A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002873zbMATH Open1247.91039MaRDI QIDQ2907967FDOQ2907967

Authors: José Luis Ferreira 

Publication date: 4 September 2012

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

noisebattle of the sexesforward inductionoutside optionBagwell's paradoxBeer-Quiche game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Commitment and observability in games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Imperfectly observable commitments in \(n\)-player games
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

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