A note on Bagwell's paradox and forward induction in three classic games

DOI10.1142/S0219198911002873MaRDI QIDQ2907967zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors José Luis Ferreira

Publication date 4 September 2012

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198911002873

zbMATH Keywords

Bagwell's paradoxbattle of the sexesBeer-Quiche gameforward inductionnoiseoutside option

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Recommendations

• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• On forward induction in money-burning games
• Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning

Cites work

• Commitment and observability in games
• Games with imperfectly observable commitment
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
• Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Stable equilibria and forward induction

Cited in

(1)

• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result

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