Labor union members play an OLG repeated game

DOI10.1073/PNAS.1400827111zbMATH Open1355.91009OpenAlexW2067863606WikidataQ30585150 ScholiaQ30585150MaRDI QIDQ2962263FDOQ2962263

Authors: Michihiro Kandori, Shinya Obayashi 

Publication date: 16 February 2017

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1400827111

Recommendations

• Community enforcement when players observe partners' past play
• Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• Cooperation in an overlapping generations experiment.
• Social Norms and Community Enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players
• Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations
• Folk theorems in overlapping generations games

Cited In (1)

• Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital

This page was built for publication: Labor union members play an OLG repeated game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2962263)