A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00214MaRDI QIDQ4789814zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Quan Wen

Publication date 14 April 2003

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesperfect equilibriumFolk theoremeffective minimaxrepeated sequential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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