A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00214MaRDI QIDQ4789814zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Quan Wen

Publication date 14 April 2003

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00214

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gameseffective minimaxFolk theoremperfect equilibriumrepeated sequential games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• On asynchronously repeated games
• Crowding games are sequentially solvable
• Coordination need not be a problem
• Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
• Allowing two moves in succession increases the game's bias: A theorem
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• The effects of leniency on cartel pricing
• Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
• Repeated sequential prisoner's dilemma: the Stackelberg variant
• Analysing the folk theorem for linked repeated games
• Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
• A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
• Maintenance in single-server queues: a game-theoretic approach

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