Repeated Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: The Stackleberg Variant

DOI10.1142/S0217595915400096zbMath1312.91016OpenAlexW2136115542MaRDI QIDQ5245844

Yifen Mu, Zhigang Cao, Xing-long Qu, Xiao-guang Yang

Publication date: 15 April 2015

Published in: Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0217595915400096

zbMATH Keywords

Markov decision processprisoner's dilemmafolk theoremsequential repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) 2-person games (91A05) Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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