scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1453152

MaRDI QIDQ4955433zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors

Publication date 15 March 2001

zbMATH Keywords

formal definitions of belief and knowledgenon-expected utility maximizerspreference and possibility formalizationspreference-based definition of belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Knowledge representation (68T30) Decision theory (91B06)

Review text

The main purpose of the paper is to investigate the formal properties of knowledge and to establish a useful axiomatic framework for appropriate notions of belief and knowledge. The three contributions of the paper may be summarized as follows: (1) By defining the belief directly as a property of an individuals' preference relations, it is possible to deduce (rather than assume) the basic properties of belief. Primitive axioms on preference relations imply properties of the different notions of belief. (2) The paper provides an unified treatment for reasoning about belief in the context of non-expected utility maximizers. Alternative definitions of belief or knowledge of non-expected utility maximizing individuals need no longer have an ad hoc flavour: a given notion of belief can be investigated across different settings (e.g., lexicographic and maxmin expected utility). (3) By identifying the relationship between different notions of belief the author provides a foundation for further work relating preferences and logical properties of belief. The obtained results extend also previously existing ones, with the proviso to make explicit the notions of belief intended to be used within special axioms such as the knowledge axiom and the positive introspection axiom. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0931.00027].

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(16)

• Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
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• ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach.
• Ambiguous games
• Expected utility without parsimony
• Support notions for belief functions
• More likely than unlikely
• Optimism and pessimism in strategic interactions under ignorance
• Weak belief and permissibility
• Preference-based unawareness
• Preference-based belief operators
• Merely partial definition and the analysis of knowledge
• Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
• Standard state space models of unawareness (extended abstract)
• Common belief in Choquet rationality and ambiguity attitudes (extended abstract)
• Reconsidering the `ingredients' of explicit knowledge

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