Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-\(k\) comparison

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.013zbMath1452.91067OpenAlexW3048823440MaRDI QIDQ2212740

Bernardo García-Pola

Publication date: 24 November 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsregret minimizationlevel-\(k\) modelmixture-of-types modelsinitial responses

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) 2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: theory and experiment

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE
• bootstrap

Cites Work

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