Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
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Cites work
- A General Definition of the Lorenz Curve
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- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3647917 (Why is no real title available?)
- Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
- Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: a structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions
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- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- Using all bids in parametric estimation of first-price auctions
- Welfare analysis of the vehicle quota system in China
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