Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry

DOI10.3982/ECTA10293MaRDI QIDQ5417249zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew Gentry, Tong Li

Publication date 16 May 2014

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10293

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsendogenous participationidentification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(22)

• Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
• Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
• Inference for first-price auctions with Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong's estimator
• Quantile regression methods for first-price auctions
• Accounting for endogeneity in regression models using copulas: a step-by-step guide for empirical studies
• Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
• How accurately do structural asymmetric first-price auction estimates represent true valuations?
• Auctions with selective entry
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
• A study of participation in dynamic auctions
• Identification in models of oligopoly entry
• Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
• Information acquisition and/or bid preparation: a structural analysis of entry and bidding in timber sale auctions
• Identification of Standard Auction Models
• Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions
• Two results on auctions with endogenous entry
• Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
• Identification and inference in first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders and selective entry
• Dynamic demand estimation in auction markets
• Econometrics of insurance with multidimensional types
• Identification of first-price auctions with endogenous entry and possibly biased beliefs

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