Partial identification in asymmetric auctions in the absence of independence
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Publication:5093201
Recommendations
- Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries
- Identification of Standard Auction Models
- Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions
- Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values
- Nonparametric identification of an interdependent value model with buyer covariates from first-price auction bids
Cited in
(8)- Semiparametric Quantile Models for Ascending Auctions With Asymmetric Bidders
- Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values
- Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
- Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries
- The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
- Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
- Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions
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