On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions
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Publication:976430
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.038zbMath1188.91084MaRDI QIDQ976430
Publication date: 11 June 2010
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.038
simulation; allocative efficiency; computational experiment; combinatorial auction; primal-dual auction; subgradient auction
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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