On the robustness of non-linear personalized price combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2010.01.038zbMATH Open1188.91084OpenAlexW2035884894MaRDI QIDQ976430FDOQ976430

Authors: B. E. Eshmatov 

Publication date: 11 June 2010

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2010.01.038

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zbMATH Keywords

simulationcombinatorial auctionallocative efficiencycomputational experimentprimal-dual auctionsubgradient auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Computationally manageable combinational auctions
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations
• The package assignment model.
• A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
• Combinatorial auction design
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations
• On the computational power of demand queries
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA

Cited In (4)

• Recent advances in robust optimization: an overview
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• A trading mechanism contingent on several indices
• A decision support framework for evaluating revenue performance in sequential purchase contexts

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