Assigning papers to referees
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Publication:1959732
DOI10.1007/s00453-009-9386-0zbMath1203.90092OpenAlexW1984187188MaRDI QIDQ1959732
Telikepalli Kavitha, Julián Mestre, Amit Kumar, Kurt Mehlhorn, Naveen Garg
Publication date: 7 October 2010
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-009-9386-0
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
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Uses Software
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Another look at the degree constrained subgraph problem
- An approximation algorithm for the generalized assignment problem
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Minimum cycle bases
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
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