A double-sided multiunit combinatorial auction for substitutes: Theory and algorithms

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2008.07.049MaRDI QIDQ1015002zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Henry Schellhorn

Publication date 30 April 2009

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.07.049

zbMATH Keywords

economic equilibriumcombinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3144124 (Why is no real title available?)
• A dominant strategy double auction
• An inverse-optimization-based auction mechanism to support a multiattribute RFQ process
• Combination trading with limit orders
• Combinatorial auction design
• Combinatorial auctions: a survey
• Equilibrium Analysis of Exchange Economies with Indivisible Commodities
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal investment in knowledge within a firm using a market mechanism
• Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction
• The Feasibility of an Index-Contingent Trading Mechanism
• The package assignment model.
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes

Cited in

(11)

• Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
• Solving the combinatorial double auction problem
• Pricing and clearing combinatorial markets with singleton and swap orders. Efficient algorithms for the futures opening auction problem
• Computational aspects of clearing continuous call double auctions with assignment constraints and indivisible demand
• A model and heuristic algorithms for multi-unit nondiscriminatory combinatorial auction
• A trading mechanism contingent on several indices
• Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions
• Solving strong-substitutes product-mix auctions
• Approximation Algorithms for k-Duplicates Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders
• ICE: an expressive iterative combinatorial exchange
• Strong substitutes: structural properties, and a new algorithm for competitive equilibrium prices

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