Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_67zbMath1466.91142arXiv1507.01353OpenAlexW2282412250MaRDI QIDQ3452842

Anthony Kim

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1507.01353

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems ⋮ Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.

Cites Work

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• Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
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• Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
• An analysis of approximations for maximizing submodular set functions—I
• The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions

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