Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
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Publication:6664585
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3073200 (Why is no real title available?)
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- When are local incentive constraints sufficient?
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