Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models
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Publication:6664585
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105923MaRDI QIDQ6664585FDOQ6664585
Authors: Sushil Bikhchandani, Debasis Mishra 
Publication date: 16 January 2025
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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