Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
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- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341
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- Revenue maximization with a single sample
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Beyond the worst-case analysis of random priority: smoothed and average-case approximation ratios in mechanism design
- Utilitarian mechanism design for multiobjective optimization
- Truthful unsplittable flow for large capacity networks
- Black-box reductions in mechanism design
- Approximate truthful mechanism design for two-dimensional orthogonal knapsack problem
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- Towards more practical linear programming-based techniques for algorithmic mechanism design
- Spectrum Bidding in Wireless Networks and Related
- Truthful Unification Framework for Packing Integer Programs with Choices
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297731 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems
- Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Algebraic Communication Complexity
- Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2005
- Equilibria of greedy combinatorial auctions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053320 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053323 (Why is no real title available?)
- Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms
- Algorithmic mechanism design with investment
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