Algorithmic mechanism design with investment

DOI10.3982/ECTA19559MaRDI QIDQ6536779zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Li, Shengwu Li, Paul R. Milgrom

Publication date 14 May 2024

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA19559

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsapproximationauctionscombinatorial optimizationinvestmentknapsack problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• An ascending Vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid
• Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
• Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Computational Complexity
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Discrete-variable extremum problems
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Handbook of combinatorial optimization. In 5 volumes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5787962 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Reducibility among combinatorial problems
• Strong NP-hardness of AC power flows feasibility
• The design of approximation algorithms
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
• Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation

Cited in

(1)

• Bargaining foundations for price taking in matching markets

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