Algorithmic mechanism design with investment
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Publication:6536779
DOI10.3982/ECTA19559zbMATH Open1541.91059MaRDI QIDQ6536779FDOQ6536779
Authors: Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Li, Shengwu Li, Paul R. Milgrom 
Publication date: 14 May 2024
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- The design of approximation algorithms
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Computational Complexity
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- Handbook of combinatorial optimization. In 5 volumes
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- Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions
- Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
- Discrete-variable extremum problems
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
- Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Strong NP-hardness of AC power flows feasibility
- Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design
- An ascending Vickrey auction for selling bases of a matroid
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