Approximate composable truthful mechanism design
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341
- An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents
- A generic truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions
Cites work
- A Strip-Packing Algorithm with Absolute Performance Bound 2
- Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
- An Online Mechanism for Resource Allocation and Pricing in Clouds
- Approximate algorithms to pack rectangles into several strips
- Approximate truthful mechanism design for two-dimensional orthogonal knapsack problem
- Approximating the non-contiguous multiple organization packing problem
- Approximation algorithms for multiple strip packing
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305407 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1418266 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297731 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297764 (Why is no real title available?)
- Maximizing the total profit of rectangles packed into a rectangle
- Online multiple-strip packing
- Parameterized approximation scheme for the multiple knapsack problem
- Performance Bounds for Level-Oriented Two-Dimensional Packing Algorithms
- STACS 2004
- STACS 2005
- The multiple subset sum problem
- There is no EPTAS for two-dimensional knapsack
- Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
- Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
Cited in
(10)- Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money
- No truthful mechanism can be better than n approximate for two natural problems
- Inapproximability of Truthful Mechanisms via Generalizations of the VC Dimension
- Approximate truthful mechanism design for two-dimensional orthogonal knapsack problem
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6519655 (Why is no real title available?)
- Truthful Unification Framework for Packing Integer Programs with Choices
- Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
- Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives
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