Computationally-feasible truthful auctions for convex bundles

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.002zbMath1142.91468OpenAlexW3124906108MaRDI QIDQ932809

Liad Blumrosen, Moshe Babaioff

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.002

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsapproximation algorithmsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Approximate composable truthful mechanism design ⋮ Approximate Truthful Mechanism Design for Two-Dimensional Orthogonal Knapsack Problem ⋮ Winner determination in geometrical combinatorial auctions

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