Approximate composable truthful mechanism design
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Publication:344791
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2016.02.025zbMath1353.91021OpenAlexW2283879421MaRDI QIDQ344791
Publication date: 24 November 2016
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2016.02.025
Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Combinatorial optimization (90C27) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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