Optimal impartial selection
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Abstract: We study the problem of selecting a member of a set of agents based on impartial nominations by agents from that set. The problem was studied previously by Alon et al. and Holzman and Moulin and has important applications in situations where representatives are selected from within a group or where publishing or funding decisions are made based on a process of peer review. Our main result concerns a randomized mechanism that in expectation awards the prize to an agent with at least half the maximum number of nominations. Subject to impartiality, this is best possible.
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Cites work
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Cited in
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450018 (Why is no real title available?)
- Indifference-Zone-Free Selection of the Best
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