Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms

MaRDI QIDQ3524721zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ron Lavi

Publication date 12 September 2008

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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