Multidimensional mechanism design: finite-dimensional approximations and efficient computation

DOI10.1287/OPRE.1100.0824MaRDI QIDQ3098298zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. Belloni, Giuseppe Lopomo, Shouqiang Wang

Publication date 17 November 2011

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10161/4439

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmsauctionsbiddinginfinite dimensionallarge-scale systemslinear programming

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Large-scale problems in mathematical programming (90C06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(11)

• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Utilitarian mechanism design for multiobjective optimization
• Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
• Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
• Procurement with cost and noncost attributes: cost-sharing mechanisms
• Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6297731 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053323 (Why is no real title available?)
• Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms
• Optimal job assignment with spillover effects

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