Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
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(16)- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
- Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions
- Black-box reductions in mechanism design
- Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
- Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
- Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
- Inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
- An algorithmic framework for black-box reductions from Bayesian mechanism design to algorithm design
- Fairness and incentive compatibility via percentage fees
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