Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms

MaRDI QIDQ3549630zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan

Publication date 5 January 2009

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
• Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms
• Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions
• Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(10)

• Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• Valuation compressions in VCG-based combinatorial auctions
• Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
• Limitations of the upward separation technique
• Inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generalizations of the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension
• Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions
• Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
• Fairness and incentive compatibility via percentage fees

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