Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_4MaRDI QIDQ3586382zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 6 September 2010

Published in Algorithms – ESA 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(7)

• Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
• Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
• On revenue maximization with sharp multi-unit demands
• A Qualitative Comparison of the Suitability of Four Theorem Provers for Basic Auction Theory
• Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification
• The power of verification for greedy mechanism design
• Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification

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