Costly information providing in binary contests

DOI10.1007/S10472-024-09953-7MaRDI QIDQ6630733zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Noam Simon, Priel Levy, David Sarne

Publication date 31 October 2024

Published in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10472-024-09953-7

zbMATH Keywords

contest designequilibriuminformation disclosuremechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General topics in artificial intelligence (68T01) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• ``Small, yet beautiful: reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
• Contest architecture
• Contest design and heterogeneity
• Designing dynamic contests
• Effective deadlock resolution with self-interested partially-rational agents
• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• Information acquisition in conflicts
• Information policy in tournaments with sabotage
• On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal sequential contests
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
• The optimal design of rewards in contests
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• The role of information in contests
• The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

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