Effectiveness of preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions

DOI10.1007/3-540-36378-5_5MaRDI QIDQ4420998zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm

Publication date 18 August 2003

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2531/25310069.htm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computing methodologies for information systems (hypertext navigation, interfaces, decision support, etc.) (68U35) Computing methodologies and applications (68U99) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(13)

• Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
• A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions
• Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
• Combinatorial auctions
• Heuristics for a bidding problem
• Preference elicitation and query learning
• Preferences of agents in decentralized task allocation
• Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2156678 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning Theory
• Constrained preference elicitation
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation
• An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem

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