Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_10zbMath1406.91173arXiv1601.07702OpenAlexW2293543530MaRDI QIDQ2959824

Michal Feldman, Noam Nisan, Brendan Lucier

Publication date: 10 February 2017

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.07702

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriasingle-item auctionscoarse equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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The Pareto frontier of inefficiency in mechanism design

Cites Work

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• Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
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• Unnamed Item