Matching auction with winner's curse and imperfect financial markets

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.128zbMATH Open1253.91199OpenAlexW2069371828MaRDI QIDQ1925659FDOQ1925659

Alexander Matros

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.128

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionasymmetric informationwinner's cursetakeover game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Financial applications of other theories (91G80)

Cited In (2)

• Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
• Creating a winner's curse via jump bids

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