Random belief equilibrium in normal form games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2003.08.004zbMATH Open1117.91304OpenAlexW2079224031MaRDI QIDQ2485484FDOQ2485484

Authors: James W. Friedman, Claudio Mezzetti 

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.004

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstrategic form gamesQuantal response equilibriumNormal form gamesRandom belief equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

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• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
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• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
• Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
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Cited In (5)

• A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
• Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
• On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations
• Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
• An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma

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