Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
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Publication:2485484
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3152611 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3228304 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3245885 (Why is no real title available?)
- Boundedly rational Nash equilibrium: A probabilistic choice approach
- Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Cited in
(5)- Consistent beliefs in extensive form games
- An experimental examination of the volunteer's dilemma
- On games and equilibria with coherent lower expectations
- A limit theorem for equilibria under ambiguous belief correspondences
- Variational preferences and equilibria in games under ambiguous belief correspondences
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