Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
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Publication:785528
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105041zbMath1447.91071OpenAlexW2970076242MaRDI QIDQ785528
Takeharu Sogo, Dan Bernhardt, Tingjun Liu
Publication date: 7 August 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/134216/7/WRAP-costly-auction-royalty-optimalilty-asymmetric-designs-Bernhardt-2020.pdf
asymmetric auctionsheterogeneous biddersoptimal auctionsauctions with participation costsroyalty payments
Related Items (3)
Bid signaling in first-price royalty auction ⋮ Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort ⋮ The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts
Cites Work
- Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- Auctions with entry
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Coordination in auctions with entry
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
- Optimal Auction Design
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