Minority voting and long-term decisions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.10.008MaRDI QIDQ980960zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach, Theresa C. Fahrenberger

Publication date 8 July 2010

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionvotingminoritydurable decisiontyranny of majority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Preferences for harmony and minority voting
• Balanced voting
• Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
• Voting on Majority Rules
• Voting in small committees

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679851 (Why is no real title available?)
• Can we rationally learn to coordinate?
• Focal points in framed strategic forms
• Hidden symmetries and focal points
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Rationalizing focal points
• Storable votes

Cited in

(5)

• Balanced voting
• Storable votes
• Preferences for harmony and minority voting
• Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation versus repression
• Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour

This page was built for publication: Minority voting and long-term decisions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q980960)