Voting in small committees

DOI10.1007/S00712-012-0321-5MaRDI QIDQ405000zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Balduzzi, Clara Graziano, Annalisa Luporini

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-012-0321-5

zbMATH Keywords

votingcommittees compositionsmall committees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Voting with public information
• Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee

Cites work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Eliciting information from multiple experts
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(4)

• Democratic versus elite governance for project selection decisions in executive committees
• Minority voting and long-term decisions
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• Biased experts, majority rule, and the optimal composition of committee

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