From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies
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Publication:4958545
DOI10.1287/MOOR.2020.1098zbMATH Open1471.91200OpenAlexW3128487315MaRDI QIDQ4958545FDOQ4958545
Authors: Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer 
Publication date: 14 September 2021
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1098
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
Cites Work
- Game theory
- Optimal Auction Design
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Concentration of Measure for the Analysis of Randomized Algorithms
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- Approximating the Nash social welfare with indivisible items
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
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- Sequential auctions and externalities
- Advertisement allocation for generalized second-pricing schemes
- Verifiably truthful mechanisms
- Bayesian combinatorial auctions: expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers
- Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
Cited In (6)
- A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources
- Fair resource allocation in a volatile marketplace
- Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents
- Search for a monetary propagation mechanism
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Urgency-aware optimal routing in repeated games through artificial currencies
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