From Monetary to Nonmonetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies
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Publication:4958545
DOI10.1287/moor.2020.1098zbMath1471.91200OpenAlexW3128487315MaRDI QIDQ4958545
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer
Publication date: 14 September 2021
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1098
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Urgency-aware optimal routing in repeated games through artificial currencies ⋮ Fair Resource Allocation in a Volatile Marketplace
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