From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies
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Publication:4958545
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5485518 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6783427 (Why is no real title available?)
- Advertisement allocation for generalized second-pricing schemes
- Approximating the Nash social welfare with indivisible items
- Bayesian combinatorial auctions: expanding single buyer mechanisms to many buyers
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Concentration of Measure for the Analysis of Randomized Algorithms
- Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
- Game theory
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Optimal Auction Design
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
- Sequential auctions and externalities
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- Verifiably truthful mechanisms
Cited in
(6)- A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources
- Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents
- Fair resource allocation in a volatile marketplace
- Search for a monetary propagation mechanism
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- Urgency-aware optimal routing in repeated games through artificial currencies
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